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Abstract
Hamilton’s original work on inclusive fitness theory assumed additivity of2
costs and benefits. Recently it has been argued that an exact version of
Hamilton’s rule for the spread of a pro-social allele (rb > c) holds under non-4
additive payoffs, so long as the cost and benefit terms are defined as partial
regression coefficients rather than payoff parameters. This paper examines6
whether one of the key components of Hamilton’s original theory can be
preserved when the rule is generalized to the non-additive case in this way,8
namely that evolved organisms will behave as if trying to maximize their
inclusive fitness in social encounters.10
Keywords: inclusive fitness, altruism, Hamilton’s rule, game theory12
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1 Introduction
Inclusive fitness theory is a widely-used framework for studying the evolution14
of social behaviour. Hamilton’s original formulation of the theory contains
two distinct though related ideas (Hamilton 1964, 1971). The first is Hamil-16
ton’s rule, the famous criterion (rb > c) for when an allele coding for a
social behaviour will be favoured by selection. This aspect of the theory18
fits with the “gene’s eye” view of evolution. The second is maximization of
inclusive fitness, rather than classical fitness, as the “goal” towards which20
an individual’s social behaviour will appear designed. This aspect fits with
the traditional individualist view of evolution, and is frequently employed by22
behavioural ecologists.
The relation between these two aspects of inclusive fitness theory is not24
fully settled. Much theoretical work has focused solely on the first aspect;
indeed the notion of individuals “trying” to maximize their inclusive fitness26
is often omitted from expositions of kin selection theory. However, recently
Grafen (2006, 2009), Queller (2011) and Gardner et al. (2011) have argued28
for the central importance of inclusive fitness maximization as the “goal” of
individual behaviour; Grafen (2006) provides a population-genetic foundation30
for the idea. This goes some way to reconciling the two aspects of Hamilton’s
theory.32
The work of Grafen, Queller and Gardner et al. suggests an intriguing
link between social evolution and rational choice theory. For in effect, these34
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authors are arguing that inclusive fitness plays the role of a utility function in
rational choice, i.e. it is the quantity that an evolved organism will behave as36
if it is trying to maximize. Thus Gardner et al. (2011) write: “we can imagine
the individual adjusting her inclusive fitness...by altering her behaviour”,38
before choosing an action which brings maximal inclusive fitness (p.1039-
40). This way of thinking about evolution is an instance of what Sober40
(1988) called “the heuristic of personification”, which says that a trait will
be favoured by natural selection if and only if a rational individual, seeking to42
maximize its fitness, would choose that trait over the alternatives. In effect,
Gardner et al. are suggesting that this heuristic is valid in social settings,44
where the trait in question is a social action, so long as “fitness” is defined
as inclusive fitness.46
Our aim here is to propose a particular way of formalizing this “rational
actor heuristic” in the context of social evolution, and to ask how generally48
it applies. This is a pressing question because Grafen’s (2006) argument
that evolution will lead to inclusive fitness maximizing behaviour assumes50
additivity of costs and benefits. This assumption is quite restrictive since in
many social situations, the benefit that a given action confers on a recipient52
may depend on the recipient’s own type (Frank 1998, Lehmann and Rousset
2014a). In our simple model below we find that if the additivity assumption54
is made, then the rational actor heuristic, with inclusive fitness as the indi-
vidual’s utility function, applies neatly. However matters are more complex56
if there is non-additivity.
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Asking whether the rational actor heuristic applies is different from asking58
whether Hamilton’s rule itself applies in non-additive scenarios. This latter
question has been extensively discussed in the literature. The upshot is that60
an exact version of Hamilton’s rule does apply under non-additivity, so long
as the cost and benefit terms are suitably defined (Queller 1992; Frank 1998,62
2013; Gardner et al. 2011); though the biological significance of the resulting
rule has been questioned (Allen et al. 2013, Birch and Okasha 2015, Birch64
2015). However this does not settle the issue about individual maximization
that is our focus here.66
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 studies social evolution
using a simple additive Prisoner’s dilemma, and shows how the rational actor68
heuristic applies to it. Section 3 considers a non-additive variant of the same
model and asks whether a similar conclusion holds. Section 4 discusses the70
results obtained.
2 The case of additive payoffs72
2.1 Additive Prisoner’s dilemma
Consider a simple model of the evolution of social behaviour of the sort used74
in evolutionary game theory. An infinite population of haploid asexual organ-
isms engage in pairwise social interactions in every generation. Organisms76
are of two types, altruists (A) and selfish (S ). A types perform an action that
is costly for themselves but benefits their partner; S types do not perform78
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the action. Type is hard-wired genetically and perfectly inherited.
An organism’s payoff from the social interaction depends on its own type80
and its partner’s type. Payoffs are interpreted as increases in lifetime repro-
ductive fitness over a unit baseline. The social action is assumed to affect82
only the actor and their partner, thus local interaction is assumed absent.
An A type incurs a cost of −c as a result of its action and confers a benefit84
of b on its partner, where c > 0 and b > 0; thus the game is a Prisoner’s
dilemma.86
Payoffs to the actor, referred to as “personal payoffs”, are shown in Table
1. We let V (i, j) denote the payoff to an actor from playing i when her oppo-88
nent plays j, where i, j ∈ {A, S}. Note that payoffs are additive: an altruist
alters their own payoff by −c and their partners’ payoff by b, irrespective of90
the type of their partner.
Partner
A S
Actor
A b− c −c
S b 0
Table 1: Additive Prisoner’s Dilemma
There are three pair-types in the population, AA, AS and SS, whose92
relative frequencies in the initial generation are fAA, fAS and fSS respectively,
where fAA +fAS +fSS = 1. The overall frequency of the A type in the initial94
generation is denoted p, where p = fAA +
1
2
fAS. The change in p over one
generation is denoted ∆p.96
The sign and magnitude of ∆p depend on the rules by which the pairs are
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formed. If pairing is random, then the S type must be fitter overall, so ∆p98
will be negative. However if pairing is assortative then the A type may be
fitter overall; for the benefits of altruistic actions then fall disproportionately100
on other altruists. Random pairing means that the frequency distribution
of the pair-types will be binomial, i.e. fAA = p
2, fAS = 2p(1 − p) and102
fSS = (1− p)2.
Where pairing is non-random, a simple regression analysis yields a mea-104
sure of the statistical correlation between social partners. We use the variable
pi to indicate an organism’s own type and p
′
i to indicate its partner’s type;106
thus pi = 1 if the i
th organism is an A, pi = 0 otherwise; and p
′
i = 1 if the i
th
organism is paired with an A, p′i = 0 otherwise. We then compute the linear108
regression of p′i on pi, given by bp′p = Cov(p
′, p)/V ar(p), which is a standard
way of defining the r term of Hamilton’s rule. Henceforth we refer to bp′p as110
r.
In the early kin selection literature, r was often defined in genealogical112
terms, e.g. as the probability that actor and partner share an allele that
is identical by descent, yielding the familiar values of 1
2
for full sibs, 1
2
for114
offspring and 1
4
for grandoffspring (see Michod and Hamilton 1980). In some
ways this definition of r is the more natural one for expressing the idea that116
organisms value their relatives’ reproduction in proportion to how closely
related they are. However the statistical definition of r, above, yields a118
version of Hamilton’s rule that is more generally applicable.
In the context of pairwise interactions, r can be conveniently expressed120
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as a difference in conditional probabilities:
r = Pr(partner is A | actor is A) − Pr(partner is A | actor is S)122
It follows that r ranges from −1 (perfect disassortment) to 1 (perfect assort-
ment); when pairing is random, r = 0.124
2.2 Evolutionary analysis
In the Appendix, we show that the change in p over one generation is given126
by:
∆p = (rb− c) · V ar(p)/w (1)
where w is average population fitness. Since V ar(p) is non-negative, this128
tells us that so long as 0 < p < 1, the A type will increase in frequency in the
population whenever rb > c, which is of course Hamilton’s rule. Since b and130
c are fixed parameters of the payoff matrix, this condition for the spread of A
is frequency-independent so long as r itself does not change as the population132
evolves. Constancy of r across generations will sometimes be a reasonable
assumption, for the pattern of assortment in the population, which is what r134
measures, may be determined by biological factors, e.g. dispersal, which are
independent of the social trait that is evolving. This assumption is considered136
further in the Discussion section.
With the constant r assumption, the outcome of the evolutionary process138
is easily determined. If rb > c the A type will spread to fixation; if rb < c the
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S type will spread to fixation; if rb = c there will be no evolutionary change.140
2.3 Rational actor analysis: preliminaries
To apply a rational actor analysis, we transpose our evolutionary model to a142
rational choice context. We consider two players playing a symmetric game.
Each player has two pure strategies, A and S. If a player plays a mixed144
strategy this means that they randomize over their pure strategies; thus piA
denotes the mixed strategy in which A is played with probability piA and S146
with probability 1 − piA. The payoff to a mixed strategy is then simply its
expected payoff.148
Each player has a utility function which measures how desirable they
find the possible outcomes of the game; we assume that both players have150
the same utility function. Each player’s goal is to maximize their utility
function. One possibility is that the utility function is given by the personal152
payoffs in Table 1 above, in which case we write U(i, j) = V (i, j), where
U(i, j) is the utility a player gets from playing i when their partner plays j;154
i, j ∈ {A, S}. There are other possibilities too; see below.
Once the players’ utility function has been specified, the next step is to156
seek the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game. (A Nash equilibrium
is a pair of strategies, possibly mixed, one for each player, each of which is158
a best response to the other.) Game theory predicts that if the players are
rational, they will end up at a Nash equilibrium of the game (see for example160
Binmore 2007). We can then ask whether the Nash equilibria of the game
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correspond to the outcomes of the evolutionary process described above. If162
so, we can conclude that evolution will lead organisms to behave as if trying
to maximize the utility function in question.164
This is a natural way of formalizing the rational actor heuristic in a game-
theoretic context. It differs somewhat from Grafen’s (2006) formalization of166
the same idea, which posits “links” between gene-frequency change and indi-
vidual optimization. Our approach allows recovery of Grafen’s main result;168
and by taking optimization to include best-response, i.e. optimal choice con-
ditional on the other player’s choice, extends easily to the non-additive case.170
A similar approach is found in Alger and Weibull (2012) and Lehmann et al.
(2015).172
2.3.1 Utility as inclusive fitness
One possibility to explore is that a player’s utility function depends on their174
partner’s payoff as well as their own. For example, suppose that a player’s
utility for any outcome is given by the quantity: personal payoff plus r times176
partner’s payoff, i.e. U(i, j) = V (i, j) + rV (j, i). Applying this transforma-
tion to the personal payoffs yields Table 2 below, which we refer to as the178
“inclusive fitness payoff matrix”.
Partner
A S
Actor
A (b− c)(r + 1) −c+ rb
S b− rc 0
Table 2: Additive PD with inclusive fitness payoffs
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This transformation was first suggested by Hamilton (1971), and has been180
discussed by Grafen (1979), Bergstrom (1995), Wade and Breden (1980), Day
and Taylor (1998), Taylor and Nowak (2007) and Martens (2015). It is a182
natural formalization of the idea that an actor, in their social behaviour, will
care about their partner’s payoff, discounted by relatedness, as well as their184
own payoff. Clearly, other transformations of the personal payoff matrix are
also conceivable.186
The payoffs in Table 2 do not correspond exactly to the verbal definition
of inclusive fitness in Hamilton (1964), which was: “the personal fitness188
which an individual actually expresses...once it is stripped of all components
which can be considered as due to the individual’s social environment...then190
augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm and benefit which
the individual himself causes to the fitnesses of his neighbours...The fractions192
in question are simply the coefficients of relationship” (p. 8). This definition
is sometimes but not always adhered in the literature.194
The discrepancy between Table 2 and Hamilton’s definition arises because
in the left column, the actor’s payoff has not been stripped of the component196
that is due to the partner’s altruistic action (b), and has been augmented
by r times the partner’s entire payoff, rather than the portion of that payoff198
that is caused by the actor (b.) Applying Hamilton’s definition exactly would
lead to the payoff matrix in Table 3 below.200
Note that Table 3 derives from Table 2 by subtraction of the quantity
b − rc from the left column. In game-theoretical terms, Table 3 is thus202
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Partner
A S
Actor
A −c+ rb −c+ rb
S 0 0
Table 3: Additive PD with Hamilton (1964) payoffs
a ”local shift” of Table 2 (and vice-versa), which means that their Nash
equilibria are necessarily identical (Weibull 1995). Therefore, if the players’204
utility function is given by Table 3, game theory predicts exactly the same
outcome(s) as if it were given by Table 2. So although taking Table 2 as206
the definition of inclusive fitness involves an element of “double counting” –
which Hamilton’s definition was designed to avoid – it is harmless.208
In fact there is a positive reason to prefer Table 2 as the definition of
inclusive fitness, in a game-theoretic context. For Hamilton’s definition does210
not generalize easily to non-additive payoffs. With non-additivity it is un-
clear how to decide which component of the actor’s payoff is “caused” by212
its partner’s action and vice-versa (cf. Allen et al. 2013). By contrast, the
definition used in Table 2 – actor payoff plus r times partner payoff – ap-214
plies just as well to the non-additive case. In order not to prejudge the issue
of whether inclusive fitness maximization, or a similar result, obtains under216
non-additivity, this is the definition preferred here.
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2.4 Rational actor analysis: results218
Suppose firstly that the utility function is personal payoff (Table 1). It is
easy to see that (S, S) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game, since S220
strongly dominates A, i.e. each player does strictly better by playing S
irrespective of their partner’s choice. This familiar result shows that the222
rational actor heuristic fails for this choice of utility function, since it would
have us conclude that altruism can never evolve, which we know to be false.224
What if the utility function is inclusive fitness payoff (Table 2)? In that
case, we can show the following. If rb > c then (A,A) is the unique Nash226
equilibrium; if rb < c then (S, S) is the unique Nash equilibrium; if rb = c
then (A,A) and (S, S) are both Nash equilibria, as is every pair of mixed228
strategies, so game theory makes no prediction about the players’ choices
(See Appendix for proof).230
It follows that with additive payoffs, defining utility as inclusive fitness
makes the rational actor heuristic valid. The condition for the A type to232
evolve, rb > c, is identical to the condition for (A,A) to be the unique Nash
equilibrium of the rational game; and similarly for S (Table 4). This supports234
the idea that evolution will lead organisms to appear as if trying to maximize
their inclusive fitness, just as Hamilton originally argued.236
An equivalent perspective on the situation is this. The quantity (rb− c)
equals the difference in a player’s inclusive fitness payoff between playing238
A and S, irrespective of what its partner does (see Table 2). Thus we can
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rb > c ⇐⇒ A evolves ⇐⇒ (A,A) is unique Nash equilibrium
rb < c ⇐⇒ S evolves ⇐⇒ (S, S) is unique Nash equilibrium
rb = c ⇐⇒ no evolution ⇐⇒ all pairs of strategies, pure and
mixed, are Nash equilbiria
Note: ⇐⇒ means “if and only if”
Table 4: Rational actor heuristic with utility = inclusive fitness
determine whether the A type will evolve by asking whether a rational agent,240
who wants to maximize their inclusive fitness, would choose A over S. In
short, equating utility with inclusive fitness ensures that the rational agent’s242
choice coincides with the “choice” made by natural selection.
2.5 A caveat: uniqueness244
One important caveat is needed. In the above model, the inclusive fitness
payoff matrix (Table 2) is not the unique utility function that yields the246
rb > c condition for action A to be chosen over S. In game theory, the utility
function is only ever unique up to choice of origin and unit; so any affine248
transformation (of the form U ′ = aU + b, where a, b ∈ R, a > 0) will leave
all Nash equilibria of the game unchanged. Furthermore, a “local shift” of250
the utility function, which involves adding a constant to any column of the
utility matrix, will also leave unchanged the Nash equilbiria, as noted above.252
One local shift of the inclusive fitness payoff matrix (Table 2) is of par-
ticular interest. If we add the quantity (rc− rb) to the left-hand column of254
Table 2, we get the matrix in Table 5 below.
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Partner
A S
Actor
A (b− c) −c+ rb
S (1− r)b 0
Table 5: Additive PD with Grafen 1979 payoffs
The payoffs in Table 5 are related to the personal payoffs (Table 1) by256
the transformation U(i, j) = rV (i, i) + (1 − r)V (i, j). This transformation
was first suggested by Grafen (1979), hence the label ‘Grafen 1979 payoff’;258
see Bergstrom (1995), Day and Taylor (1998), Alger and Weibull (2012) for
discussion. By contrast with the inclusive fitness payoffs (Table 2), which260
involve adding r times partner’s payoff to the actor’s personal payoff, the
Grafen 1979 payoffs involve taking an (r, 1 − r) weighted average of the262
personal payoff that would accrue to the actor if their partner had chosen
the same as the actor and if their partner made the choice that they actually264
did.
Since the Grafen 1979 payoff matrix (Table 5) is a local shift of the in-266
clusive fitness payoff matrix (Table 2), the Nash equilibria of the resulting
games are identical; thus the rational actor heuristic works equally well with268
either. (This is because in both cases, (rb − c) is the payoff difference be-
tween playing A and S.) Therefore while our simple model has vindicated270
Hamilton’s claim that evolution will lead organisms to behave as if trying to
maximize their inclusive fitness, it is important to see that inclusive fitness272
(whether defined our way (Table 2) or in Hamilton’s original way (Table 3)),
is not the unique quantity of which this maximization claim is true.274
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3 Non-additive payoffs
To determine whether the above results generalize to the non-additive case,276
we consider a modified Prisoner’s dilemma in which the payoff to an A type
paired with another A type is (b−c+d) rather than (b−c). So the parameter278
d quantifies the deviation from payoff additivity, or synergistic effect, when
two A types are paired together; d can be either positive or negative. The280
resulting payoff structure (Table 6) is sometimes referred to as a ‘synergy
game’ (van Veelen 2009).282
Partner
A S
Actor
A b− c+ d −c
S b 0
Table 6: Non-additive Prisoner’s dilemma (‘synergy game’)
Again, we assume that pairs of organisms are drawn from an infinite
population to play the game; type is genetically hard-wired and mutation is284
absent.
3.1 Evolutionary analysis286
As before, ∆p denotes the change in frequency of the A type over a genera-
tion. Unsurprisingly, rb > c is no longer the condition for ∆p to be positive.288
However an exact version of Hamilton’s rule can be recovered by suitably
defining the cost and benefit terms, as emphasized by Gardner et al. (2011),290
whose approach we follow here. (A different approach, not discussed here,
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incorporates non-additive payoffs into Hamilton’s rule by a weak selection292
approximation; see for example Lehmann and Rousset 2014b).
For each individual i, we let wi denote its actual reproductive fitness294
(number of offspring). We then write wi as a linear regression on pi and p
′
i:
wi = α + bwp.p′pi + bwp′.pp
′
i + ei (2)
where α is baseline fitness; bwp.p′ is the partial regression of an individual’s296
fitness on their own type, controlling for their partner’s type; bwp′.p is the
partial regression of an individual’s fitness on their partner’s type, controlling298
for their own type; and ei is the residual. These partial regression coefficients
quantify the average effect (sensu Fisher 1930) of the actor’s action, and their300
partner’s action’s, on the actor’s fitness.
Following Hamilton (1964), instead of considering the effect on the actor’s302
fitness of their partner’s action bwp′.p, we can consider the effect on their
partner’s fitness of the actor’s action, denoted bw′p.p′ . These two partial304
regression coefficients are numerically identical (Taylor et al. 2007). (This
is the well-known switch from ‘neighbour-modulated’ to ‘inclusive’ fitness.)306
Following Gardner et al. (2011), we denote the bwp.p′ and bw′p.p′ coefficients
as −C and B respectively.308
Importantly, equation (2) can be fitted whether or not the true relation
between w, pi and p
′
i is linear. In the non-additive case under considera-310
tion that relation is non-linear (since d > 0), which implies that the partial
regression coefficients −C and B will be functions of population-wide gene312
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frequencies, and liable to change as the population evolves. Therefore un-
like c and b, which are fixed payoff parameters, −C and B are population314
variables.
Following Gardner et al. (2007, p. 219), we can write explicit expressions316
for −C and B in terms of r, p, and the parameters of the payoff matrix b, c
and d. This yields:318
−C = (−c) + (d) · [r + p(1− r)]/[1 + r] (3)
B = (b) + (d) · [r + p(1− r)]/[1 + r] (4)
We can then derive the following expression for evolutionary change:320
∆p = (rB − C) · V ar(p)/w (5)
where w is average population fitness (see Appendix). Equation (5) tells us
that when 0 < p < 1, the A type will increase in frequency if and only if322
rB > C. This is a generalized version of Hamilton’s rule, applicable whether
payoffs are additive or not.324
The quantity (rB−C), whose sign determines whether altruism spreads,
can be computed by adding equation (3) to r times equation (4). After326
simplifying this yields:
rB − C = (rb− c) + d[r + p(1− r)] (6)
Note that (rB − C) is a function of p, so satisfaction of rB > C in gen-328
18
eration t does not imply its satisfaction in generation t+ 1. Selection is thus
frequency-dependent, and neither type will necessarily spread to fixation. A330
polymorphic equilibrium will obtain when p = [c − r(b + d)]/d[1 − r]; the
stability of this equilibrium depends on the sign of d. The full evolutionary332
dynamics are summarized in Table 7 below; see Appendix for proof.
Case 1: r < 1, d > 0
(i) rb− c+ rd ≥ 0 A evolves to fixation
(ii) rb− c+ d ≤ 0 S evolves to fixation
(iii) rb− c+ d > 0 > rb− c+ rd unstable polymorphism
at p = [c− r(b+ d)]/d[1− r]
Case 2: r < 1, d < 0
(i) rb− c+ d ≥ 0 A evolves to fixation
(ii) rb− c+ rd ≤ 0 S evolves to fixation
(iii) rb− c+ d < 0 < rb− c+ rd stable polymorphism
at p = [c− r(b+ d)]/d[1− r]
Case 3: r = 1
(i) b− c+ d > 0 A evolves to fixation
(ii) b− c+ d < 0 S evolves to fixation
(iii) b− c+ d = 0 no evolutionary change
Table 7: Evolutionary dynamics of non-additive PD
The general version of Hamilton’s rule embodied in equation (5) raises334
interesting interpretive questions. Some have argued that the rule in this
form has little explanatory value (Nowak et al. 2011, Allen et al. 2013);336
while others have seen the generality of the rule as an advantage, a proof that
inclusive fitness theory does not rely on restrictive assumptions (Gardner et338
al. 2011). This debate has been analyzed elsewhere (Birch 2015, Birch and
Okasha 2015) and is not the focus here.340
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Instead our question is this. Given that equation (5) is true, and given the
resulting evolutionary dynamics, can the rational actor heuristic be applied?342
Will evolution lead organisms to behave as if maximizing a utility function,
and if so what is it?344
Importantly, the answer to this question cannot simply be read off equa-
tion (5). In the additive case there was a simple link between Hamilton’s rule346
and a utility function with the desired property: rb−c > 0 was the condition
for the A type to spread, and (rb− c) the utility difference between playing348
A and S. One might hope to extrapolate this to the non-additive case by
simply replacing (rb− c) with (rB −C) in Table 2. However since B and C350
are functions of p, they cannot meaningfully feature in the utility function.
The reason is as follows. The point of the rational actor heuristic is to352
find a link between gene-frequency dynamics and a “goal” that organisms
behave as if they are trying to achieve. Such a link would be trivial if the354
“goal” were allowed to change as gene frequencies change. For the heuristic
to have any value, the goal must remain fixed. So our task is to find a utility356
function whose arguments are restricted to the payoff parameters (b, c and
d), and the relatedness coefficient r, which makes the rational actor heuristic358
work.
3.2 Rational actor analysis360
To address this question, we again transpose the evolutionary model to a
rational choice context and study the Nash equilibria of the resulting game.362
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Suppose firstly that the utility function is given by the inclusive fitness payoff
transformation, i.e. personal payoff plus r times partner payoff. This yields364
the payoffs in Table 8 below.
Partner
A S
Actor
A (b− c+ d)(r + 1) −c+ rb
S b− rc 0
Table 8: Non-additive PD with inclusive fitness payoffs
The Nash equilibria are then as follows:366
(A,A) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if rb− c+ d(r + 1) ≥ 0
(S, S) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if rb− c ≤ 0
(piA, piA) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where piA
= (c− rb)/d(1 + r), so long as 0 < piA < 1.
It follows that, unlike in the additive case, the rational actor heuristic
does not work when utility is defined as inclusive fitness. The condition for368
(A,A) to be a Nash equilibrium is not identical to the condition for A to
evolve to fixation; similarly for S. Furthermore, the condition for there to be370
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is not the same as the condition for there
to be a polymorphism. So it is not true that at evolutionary equilibrium,372
organisms will behave as if trying to maximize their inclusive fitness.
Can we find a utility function modulo which the rational actor heuristic374
works? The answer is yes. The Grafen 1979 payoff matrix, which to recall
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is derived from the personal payoff matrix by the transformation U(i, j) =376
rV (i, i) + (1 − r)V (i, j), does the trick. This yields the payoffs in Table 9
below.378
Partner
A S
Actor
A (b− c+ d) −c+ rb+ rd
S (1− r)b 0
Table 9: Non-additive PD with Grafen 1979 payoffs
The Nash equilibria are then as follows:
(A,A) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if rb− c+ d ≥ 0
(S, S) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if rb− c+ rd ≤ 0
(piA, piA) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where piA
= (c− r(b+ d))/d(1− r), so long as 0 < piA < 1.
This restores the rational actor heuristic. In particular, if (A,A) is the380
only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, then A evolves to fixation; if (S, S)
is the only pure-strategy equilibrium, then S evolves to fixation. If there382
is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium but no pure strategy equilibria, the
population evolves to a stable polymorphism; if there is a mixed-strategy384
Nash equilibrium and both (A,A) and (S, S) are pure-strategy equilibria,
then there is an unstable polymorphism; in both cases, the weights on A and386
S in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium equal the proportions of A and
S in the polymorphism. Thus there is a tight correspondence between the388
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Nash equilibria and the evolutionary dynamics, summarized in Table 10 (see
Appendix for proof)390
(A,A) is only pure N.E. =⇒ A evolves to fixation
(S, S) is only pure N.E. =⇒ S evolves to fixation
(piA, piA) is only N.E. ⇐⇒ stable polymorphism at p = piA
(piA, piA), (A,A), (S, S) all N.E. ⇐⇒ unstable polymorphism at p = piA
Note: piA = (c− r(b+ d)/d(1− r))
Table 10: Rational actor heuristic, utility = Grafen 1979 payoff
The upshot is that with non-additive payoffs, the rational actor heuristic
will work so long as the utility function is defined as Grafen 1979 payoff,392
rather than inclusive fitness payoff. Again any affine transformation of the
Grafen 1979 payoff matrix, or any local shift, will also preserve the correspon-394
dences above. Note that, unlike in the additive case, the Grafen 1979 payoff
matrix (Table 9) is not a local shift of the inclusive fitness payoff matrix396
(Table 8). This is why the rational actor heuristic fails if utility is defined as
inclusive fitness in the non-additive case.398
4 Discussion
Hamilton’s original formulation of inclusive fitness theory assumed additivity400
of costs and benefits. A number of authors have emphasized that an exact
version of Hamilton’s rule holds with non-additive payoffs, so long as the −C402
and B terms are suitably defined. Here we have focused on the relevance of
payoff additivity not for Hamilton’s rule itself, but for Hamilton’s (logically404
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distinct) claim that evolution will lead organisms to behave as if trying to
maximize their inclusive fitness, understood here to mean personal payoff406
plus r times partner payoff.
In a recent critique, Allen et al. (2013) observe that arguments for inclu-408
sive fitness maximization all rely on payoff additivity, and that where selec-
tion is frequency-dependent, fitness maximization need not generally occur.410
They write: “evolution does not, in general, lead to the maximization of
inclusive fitness or any other quantity” (p. 20138).412
Our analysis partly supports this conclusion. Here we have understood
maximization to include best-response, so that the presence of frequency-414
dependence does not automatically preclude a maximization principle from
holding; and we have allowed the utility function to be any function of the416
payoff parameters b, c and d and the relatedness coefficient r. At the evo-
lutionary equilibrium of our simple non-additive model, it is not true that418
organisms behave as if trying to maximize their inclusive fitness payoff. How-
ever there is a somewhat similar quantity – Grafen 1979 payoff – that organ-420
isms do behave as if they are trying to maximize.
It is an open question whether our positive result – maximization of422
Grafen 1979 payoff – extends to more complicated models of social evolu-
tion, e.g. that incorporate local interaction, multiple social partners, or class424
structure, or to more realistic genetic architectures than haploid inheritance.
There is no guarantee that it does, as such models typically lead to more426
complicated evolutionary dynamics than those assumed here. As has been
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emphasized before, a valid maximization argument must always deduce the428
quantity being maximized, if any, from the underlying evolutionary dynamics
(Mylius and Diekmann 1995).430
Also, we have assumed that the coefficient of relatedness, r, remains con-
stant as the population evolves. Without this assumption, it makes little432
sense to allow the utility function to depend on r, as this would be tanta-
mount to positing a changing “goal” so would again trivialize the rational434
actor heuristic. In some inclusive fitness models, r is in fact a dynamic vari-
able rather than a constant (e.g. van Baalen and Rand 1998), so it cannot be436
assumed that our results, or ones like them, can be derived for these models.
Our negative result, that maximization of inclusive fitness only holds438
with additive payoffs, is in line with previous results by Bergstrom (1995)
and Lehmann and Rousset (2014a); it supports some of the claims made440
by opponents of inclusive fitness theory such as Allen and Nowak (2015).
The key logical point to note is that although a version of Hamilton’s rule is442
indeed a fully general evolutionary principle, as Gardner et al. (2011) stress,
no principle about individual maximization can be deduced directly from this444
form of the rule. Whether such a principle holds, and if so what the quantity
being maximized is, needs to be shown on a case-by-case basis.446
Finally, what are the implications for biological practice? Behavioural
ecologists have often used inclusive fitness maximization as a way to interpret448
observed behaviour in the field, in line with Hamilton’s original suggestion.
Our analysis suggests that this will not always be possible. If an observed450
25
social behaviour fails to maximize an individual’s inclusive fitness, defined as
personal payoff plus r times partner’s payoff, the behaviour may nonetheless452
be adaptive and the population at an evolutionary equilibrium. Moreover
the quantity we have called “Grafen 1979 payoff” will serve the needs of the454
behavioural ecologist seeking to identify the “goal” of evolved behaviour in
a broader range of cases than will inclusive fitness itself.456
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